Uranium Weapons Cover-ups in Our
Midst
Piotr Bein,
PhD
Independent
A brief invited to
World Uranium Weapons Conference
Post-conference
version,
…We deal
With invisible
enemies
We trade
In dangers unseen… -- Afon Claerwen,
November 2002
Introduction
From
The concept of toxic-radioactive warfare dates back to World War
II when air attacks with uranium oxide aerosols were considered a realistic
threat. The military recognized the potential of uranium smoke (aerosol) as a
terrain contaminant and an instrument of gas warfare that kills and
incapacitates troops and civilians and denies territory to enemy.
The War Department was later re-named Department of Defense
(Pentagon). Pentagon knew the hazards of fine uranium particles, but has
developed depleted uranium (DU) ammunition that became a contentious issue
after wars in the
Cover-ups of uranium effects must have gone on since WW II, but
pro-DU propaganda surfaced only after the first massive use of DU ammunition in
1991 Gulf War. That war broke a 46-year-long taboo against the intentional use
or induction of radioactivity in combat, creating a military and legal
precedent, and trivializing the combat use of radioactive materials.
The “Kosovo” DU scandal in 2000/2001 saw information warfare
employed to defend uranium non-atomic weapons, including intimidation of vocal
victims of DU, independent researchers, and activists in the West and former
Soviet block countries. A growing number of concerned groups
tracked misinformation, deceptions and the politics of uranium weapons. This
material precipitated propaganda analyses presented to international
conferences in
The latter paper married the propaganda and the legalistic themes,
as the illegality of uranium weapons continues to be the weakest point
(actually, a no-point) of their proponents. UN resolutions since 1996 call DU
weaponry "incompatible" (i.e. illegal) under existing humanitarian
law and human rights [UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/27 and additions;
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/38 and E/CN.4/.Sub.2/2003/35]. The cover-ups are bound to tighten
around the illegality issues.
UK researcher Dai Williams substantially expanded the
understanding of uranium weapons other than DU. Shaped charge munitions,
explosive charges, a fill in thermobaric bombs, and a
new generation of hard target guided weapons that use "dense metal"
to double their penetration effect are all suspect of containing uranium [http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/du2012.htm;
http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/u231.htm; http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/u23.htm]. Misinformation and cover-ups of these weapons exhibit patterns
similar to those employed for DU armour-piercers.
Uranium shaped charge warheads are rapidly proliferating in smaller
ground-to-ground and air-to-ground missile systems. A
variation of shaped charges are used in anti-tank cluster bombs.
Uranium Medical Research Centre (UMRC) found high contamination of
residents near sites bombed in
Media reports, and political and legal campaigns, including the
work of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights,
have focused specifically on DU weapons. The isotopic composition of
military uranium residue in
How does it affect us
If the new weapon systems contain undepleted
uranium, then the governments responsible can deny that they use DU. Williams writes: “Scores of written replies from the UK
Government to MPs, and personal correspondence to me, have contained specific
denials about the use of DU in guided weapons of all kinds. They have declined
to respond to recent questions about undepleted
uranium.” The ability to uncover uranium weapons other than DU depends much on
public opinions. The complex will continue to mislead. Our movement, using
outside scientific and legalistic expertise, must change existing perceptions.
Each new war disposes of very hazardous nuclear waste on new
territory, away from the producer’s country, in uranium weapons that the
proponents call “conventional”. We are unfortunately richer in experience
through a series of wars that the
The material and evidence I reviewed for this invited brief
indicates that anti-uranium weapon movement is infiltrated and corrupted. The
subterfuge usually occurs on the more specialized frontlines, into where the
general membership does not look and therefore remains unaware of the threats.
Consequently, the establishment has marginalized, if not intimidated, many of
our warriors, making them less effective and delaying the achievement of our
goals. The manipulations create or increase our polarization, and plant
intrigues among our groups, which lead to distrust within the movement and
frustrate the efforts of sincere membership. Davey
Garland wrote: “these issues are vital to the survival of the movement, but
also for it to evolve.” [du-watch,
I submit some of the cases that have sufficient background
material for verification. I present them without prejudice and in good faith,
trusting they will help our leaders and members use them wisely for the common
good. Hopefully, this brief will be useful for dealing with the perpetrators:
remedying the damage done within our ranks and in public opinions, and
mitigating adversary’s future attempts. We can make a change even though we
cannot control production and use of the weapons.
Responsible authorities are liable under a wide range of
international law beyond humanitarian law. They contaminate battlefields with
military uranium and endanger health of civilians and combatants. The findings
of research into the health effects of DU and other weaponry containing
radiation but not causing nuclear fission or fusion explosions (which as a
whole are referred to as radiological weaponry in this brief) are
indisputable. Even a cursory review of humanitarian law supports the conclusion
that uranium weaponry of any type is so patently illegal that the discussion
should really focus on bringing to justice those who have used it and
redirecting action towards the victims of these weapons. But the
international community and the anti-uranium movement still confronts the
“denial and deflect” policies of the weapon makers, proliferators and users.
Understanding of humanitarian law relating to weaponry and the
consequences of violations reveals why those responsible think they have to
cover-up that they knowingly developed and used "illegal" weapons.
Rather than face those consequences, they misstate, mislead, and misinform.
This brief analyses the cover-ups with a view on exposing the
methods and tactics for the movement to educate themselves in preparation for
effective countermeasures. Part 1 outlines the anatomy of cover-ups:
group-think, information warfare and media manipulation. Part 2 presents our
adversary’s tactics and effectiveness. Part 3 analyses cases that illustrate
Parts 1 and 2 in the context of prime concern to this conference: our
adversary’s cover-up and deception operations imposed on the movement.
Conclusions and recommendations are mine, as well as supplied in confidence and
extracted from postings to du-watch. They are by no
means complete, but are meant to precipitate discussions and thinking. Readers
familiar with my previous work can proceed to Parts 3 and 4.
Part 1: Anatomy of cover-ups
Reasons for cover-ups
Bein and
Parker [2003] summarized the health hazards of uranium in non-nuclear weapons
and civilian applications: radioactivity and toxicity. The hazards are similar,
regardless of the type of uranium metal used: depleted, non-depleted or in
alloys with other metals. That paper gave an ample sampling of government,
military and industry documents that prove the authorities responsible for
uranium contamination knew about the risks involved – the principal reason they
suppressed the evidence.
Uranium radiation hazards are covered-up and misrepresented.
Central technical basis in the deception are obsolete models of risk and
derived standards of allowable exposure. The total radiological dose inside an
exposed person over years severely exceeds safe limits. Standards set by the
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) derive from
empirically invalid assumptions due to secrecy and distortions around the
effects of
Physicists instead of biologists developed the ICRP model before
DNA was known, yet it purports to represent cell damage processes. ICRP model
spreads a dose over a large mass of tissue instead of considering biophysical
and biochemical damage mechanisms at the cellular level. A critique by the
European Committee on Radiation Risk reveals that ICRP
models of risk from internal particles underestimate empirical mortality and
morbidity by a factor of 100 to 1000 [ECRR 2003].
A team from the Uranium Medical Research Center (UMRC) reported
after a visit to hard-target bomb sites in
The perpetrators of all radiological wars and illegal weapons face
potential liability for war crimes, military and civilian casualties,
contamination of environment, and battlefield clean-up costs as well as social
costs of other parts of the uranium weapon cycle, including disposal of
astronomic quantities of expired uranium weapons on own territory. Cover-ups and
deceptions are expected under such circumstances.
The second reason for cover-ups is long-term. DU weapons belong to
the diffuse category of low-radiological-impact nuclear weapons to which
emerging types of low-yield (i.e., 4th generation) nuclear explosives
also belong. The cover-ups might serve to ease public acceptability of present
uranium weapons against hard targets, present small nuclear warheads, and
future pure fusion nuclear weapons [Gsponer 2003].
All of these weapons contaminate with low level radiation. A future combat
scenario with micro-nukes translates into a low-level radioactive input
comparable to that on DU battlefields [http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0210071].
Elimination of uranium radiological weapons would not terminate the health and
environmental problems of low-level radiation battles.
Group-think
Uranium weapons likely persist due to institutional pressures
that, once started to defend an effective DU bullet, escalated to a point of no
return. Substitution of uranium weapons would indirectly admit the hazards,
while ample evidence incriminates those responsible because they knew the
potential dangers from the beginning. In an extreme case scenario, war-mongers
and ethnic-haters in high positions may have discovered in uranium weapons an
effective toxic-radioactive terrorist tool. With it, they can damage present
and future generations of the “enemy” without public stigma of WMD, though with
some “collateral damage” to own civilians and troops over the lifecycle of the
weapons.
The US and UK governments claim they deploy DU ammunition because
it costs less than tungsten, has an advantage over enemy armour,
reduces own casualties and utilizes industrial waste.
The claims are not justified. The additional expense on tungsten
is negligible both relative to the military value of a destroyed target, and in
the total military spending. This is a socially irresponsible reasoning, as it
ignores the health costs and clean-up costs over the life-cycle of uranium
weapons. Recent announcements about development of tungsten substitutes of DU
tank ammunition undermine the claim. The DU weapon systems are not better or
cheaper than alternatives. Military applications of DU do not utilize significant
quantities of nuclear waste, either.
Own soldiers, the victims of “friendly fire” suffer from acute
poisoning and radiation sickness, instead of ordinary wounds, while longer-term
casualties are substantial. A September 2002 Gulf War report on US veterans
shows 0.1% casualty rate in combat, but a 36% post-combat rate for almost 700
thousand troops engaged in the war and shortly after. However, according to a
1998 admission of the military, only some 436 thousand troops entered into areas
that were contaminated by DU dust. That boosts the casualty rate to 58%
post-combat! Uranium is one of several major causes of the syndrome, so a
casualty rate of about ten percent could be attributed to DU.
Official reports in the West ignore civilian casualties of uranium
weapons in
Pro-uranium propaganda has seriously compromised scientific
reports subject to military-government funding and control, even those by
international organizations. Deceitful propaganda also appears in statements
from government, military and arms and nuclear industry. It is of great concern
that political representatives are unable to obtain information from
alternative sources and uncritically trust doctored intelligence and distorted
data. This points to a fundamental flaw in how these
countries address military issues and weapons. Countless journalists,
researchers, professors, and persons in responsible public positions help in
misinformation campaigns, thus breaking professional ethics of primary
allegiance to public good. Willingly or not, knowingly or not, they collude in
the crimes by spreading lies and distortions about fatal effects of uranium.
The propaganda has led to an absurd situation where US and
Williams considered that civilian and military decision makers
responsible for uranium weapons may be caught up in a self-justifying logic
that generates illusory morality, demands conformity, accepts high risk
strategies and demonizes enemies and dissenters. Some Western governments seem
to be following the group-think in the wars with “Saddam”, “Milosevic” and
recently the "Wars on Terrorism". Group-think in authoritarian
organizations would explain why the military downplayed or outright ignored the
health risks of uranium weapons, and why those responsible chose to cover up
their criminal position, rather than relinquish uranium weapons.
Indirect evidence exists that cover-up was desired to deceive the
public and escape liabilities. In 1947 a secret memo from the US Atomic Energy
Commission had this self-incriminating statement about medical experiments on
human subjects: "It is desired that no document be released which refers
to experiments with humans and might
have adverse effects on public opinion or result in legal suits. Documents
covering such work field should be classified 'secret.' "
Following the full scale low-radiation experiment with DU bullets
in Gulf War I, a memo dated
The
As hard-target uranium weapons came on the development and use
stream, the philosophy must have been extended to the new applications.
Logically, similar cover-up approach would govern next weapons that leave
low-level radiation behind, for many generations to deal with.
Information warfare
Information warfare is one of the instruments of power, beside
combat, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. PsyOps
(Psychological Operations) are among its most conspicuous tools. Information
warfare is effective and inexpensive compared to combat, and would fit the
needs of “Service/DoD proponency”
named in Ziehmn’s memo. The military specifies the
structure and methods of Information Operations that engage behavioural
science, mass media and high technology [Joint Chiefs of Staff1987;
Headquarters Department of the Army 1996].
According to NATO [Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff 1996], their PsyOps target "enemy,
friendly and neutral audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior
affecting the achievement of political and military objectives." NATO and
candidate countries’ military and media act like clones of Pentagon. Critique
comes mainly from pressure groups and governments outside the Pact.
Information Warfare integrates several types of special services
when needed. A joint command of US Special Operations is then engaged to
assemble teams of various “specialists” to suit a mission. Assaults on anti-DU
activist, Dr. Doug Rokke, former Pentagon expert on
DU, were likely steered by US Special Operations in a broader campaign of
"fighting" the truth. Former Chief of Nuclear Medicine at the
Veterans Affairs Medical Facility, Dr. Asaf Durakovic, was forced to leave the